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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE

Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA
and the Shift of IP Rights
Enforcement
Yvette Joy Liebesman*

ABSTRACT
The ex parte seizure provision of the Defend Trade Secrets Act is another
step in a long line of legislation that shifts the costs of private enforcement
to the public, which already has a toehold in copyright and trademark law.
The ex parte provision—which is not incorporated into any state trade secret law—relieves rights owners of two “burdens.” First, it relieves the
trade secret owner of the burden of actually having to compete in the marketplace. Second, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of the
costs associated with the discovery process of a lawsuit. The effect of this
cost shifting results in anticompetitive behavior, is ripe for abuse, and offers no added benefit to what is provided via state trade secret causes of
action and remedies.

This essay is based on Professor Yvette Joy Liebesman’s presentation at the March 10,
2017 Symposium on “Implementing and Interpreting the Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016,” hosted by the University of Missouri School of Law’s Center for Intellectual
Property and Entrepreneurship and the School’s Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax
Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION

This article will discuss the provision under the federal Defend Trade Secrets
Act1 (“DTSA”) that allows for ex parte seizures of goods which are alleged to be
produced via the misappropriation of trade secrets and materials that are alleged to
contain misappropriated trade secrets—such as laptops, media storage, and paper
documents.2 Several trade secret scholars have written extensively regarding substantive issues surrounding the ex parte seizure provision and its enforcement.3 This
article focuses on how the ex parte seizure provision follows a trend by which rights
owners have steadily sought to shift enforcement of private intellectual property
rights from themselves to taxpayers and other entities.
Cost shifting has become so ubiquitous that we do not even realize it is happening. For example, we have all seen these notices: “go green,” “get your bank
statement, credit card bill, or W-2 online”, and “save the planet!” However, many
of us want that paper copy. So, if I choose to “go green” and have the document
sent to me electronically, what is really happening is cost shifting. When a document is sent to consumers through the U.S. Postal Service, the institution that created the document pays for the printing and mailing.4 Alternatively, if the document
is sent electronically, those costs are absorbed by consumers who choose to “go
green,” but still want the paper document. Similarly, this cost shifting has been an
ongoing theme with intellectual property law enforcement; the latest target is enforcement of trade secrets through the ex parte seizure provision under the federal
DTSA, a right not provided by any state trade secret statute.5
The DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision relieves rights owners of two “burdens.” First, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden of actually having to
compete in the marketplace.6 Second, it relieves the trade secret owner of the burden
of the costs associated with the discovery process of a lawsuit.7 Thus, this provision

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Prof. Dennis
Crouch and the editors of the Missouri Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review for organizing
the symposium, and for the invitation to participate. She is also grateful for comments and suggestions
from David Levine, and for the help of her very capable research assistant, Rachel Jag.
1. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
2. See, e.g., Earthbound Corp. v. MiTek USA, Inc., 2016 WL 4418013, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Aug.
19, 2016) (ordering Defendants to “immediately deliver to a neutral third-party expert in the greater
Seattle area all flash drives, SD cards, cell phones, and other external drives used by the individual
defendants . . . that are in Defendants’ possession, custody, or control.”).
3. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 284 (2015) [hereinafter Ex Parte Seizures]; David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here
Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. ONLINE 230 (2015); Eric Goldman et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S. 1890, H.R. 3326),
CYBERLAW.STANFORD.EDU 1 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/blogs/2015%20Professors%20Letter%20in%20Opposition%20to%20DTSA%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Professors’ Letter].
4. See generally Jane Porter, 10 Ways to Trim Shipping Costs, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 17, 2012),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/224619.
5. Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 285.
6. Eric Goldman, David S. Levine, & Sharon K. Sandeen, Federal Trade Secret Bill Re-Introduced—
and It’s Still Troublesome, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2015), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-trade-secret-bill-re-introduced-and-its-still-troublesome-guest-blogpost.htm.
7. See William P. Glenn, Jr., Ex-Parte Seizure of Intellectual Property Goods, 9 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L. J. 307, 309 (2001).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/betr/vol1/iss2/4

2

Liebesman: Ex Parte Seizures and DTSA

No. 2]

Liebesman; Ex Parte Seizures Under the DTSA

385

has the strong potential to become an anti-competitive arrow in intellectual property
owners’ quivers.

II.

THE COST SHIFTING EVOLUTION IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW

Before delving into the ex parte seizure provision as a new enforcement tool
found within the DTSA, this article will first illustrate how this trend of enforcement
shifting—and thus, cost shifting— is already present with trademark and copyright
rights.8
Trademark and copyright owners have been successful in persuading Congress
to legislatively expand and shift enforcement duties to governmental bodies and
other entities regarding private intellectual property rights beyond customary importation authority.9

A. Stopping the Importation of Counterfeit Goods at the Border via
Customs and Border Patrol, and the Importance of Having a Registered Mark
Under both the Lanham Act10 and the Tariff Act of 1930,11 Customs and Border
Protection (“CBP”) has long had the authority to seize counterfeit goods at the border. 12 At ports of entry, CBP personnel regularly seize counterfeit and otherwise
infringing toys, computers, DVD, handbags, apparel, shoes, and consumer electronics.13
8. Another area where cost shifting has occurred—with serious constitutional implications—is in the
criminal justice system, local governments have shifted the burden of trials and custody from taxpayers
to defendants—even when acquitted—to cover court/trial and custodial costs. See, e.g., Joseph Shapiro,
As Court Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor (noting that while
this is a shift from public to private cost shifting, it shifts the financial burden onto defendants rather
than the party instigating the court action, the government).
9. See Protecting Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Oversees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/protecting-intellectual-propertyrights-ipr (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (2012) (“[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the
name of any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located
in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the
United States, or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter . . . shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United States[.]”); 19 C.F.R. §
133.21(b)(1) (2016) (“CBP may detain any article of domestic or foreign manufacture imported into the
United States that bears a mark suspected by CBP of being a counterfeit version of a mark that is registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”).
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b) (2012) (“Any such merchandise imported into the United States in violation of the provisions of this section shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture for violation of the customs laws.”); see also Customs Border Protection Increases Seizure of Counterfeit and Pirated Goods
in 2008, SHIPMAN & GOODWIN LLP (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.shipmangoodwin.com/customs-borderprotection-increases-seizure-of-counterfeit-and-pirated-goods-in-2008.
12. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a) (“A ‘counterfeit mark’ is a spurious mark that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a mark registered on the Principal Register of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”) (emphasis added).
13. See Reinaldo Rodriguez, CBP Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Statistics FY 2016, TAGGART
INT’L, LTD. (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.taggart-intl.com/cbp-intellectual-property-rights-seizure-statistics-fy-2016/; see also Thomas C. Frohlich, Alexander E.M. Hess, & Vince Calio, 9 Most
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The reliance on CBP to seize counterfeit goods is a huge benefit to the rights
owners. We are probably all familiar with the recent Supreme Court decision of
Matal v. Tam, where the Court held that the United States Patent and Trademark
Office’s (“USPTO”) ban on registering offensive marks under § 2(a) of the Lanham
Act14 was an unconstitutional viewpoint restriction on speech.15 What would have
happened if the Supreme Court had upheld the Trademark Office’s ability to refuse
registration of offensive marks? In Matal v. Tam, the Supreme Court explained that,
[w]ithout federal registration, a valid trademark may still be used in commerce. And an unregistered trademark can be enforced against would-be
infringers in several ways. Most important, even if a trademark is not federally registered, it may still be enforceable under §43(a) of the Lanham
Act, which creates a federal cause of action for trademark infringement . .
. [u]nregistered trademarks may also be entitled to protection under other
federal statutes, such as the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
. . . . And an unregistered trademark can be enforced under state common
law, or if it has been registered in a State, under that State’s registration
system.16
While the Court explicitly stated that it would not decide whether a mark owner
“could bring suit under § 43(a) if his application for federal registration had been
lawfully denied under the disparagement clause,” 17 this discussion will assume that
a ban on registerability under § 2 of the Lanham Act18 will not render the mark
unenforceable as an unregistered mark under § 43(a)(1)(A). 19 Why would Dan
Snyder, owner of the Washington, D.C. professional football team, 20 or the National
Football League care about registration if they can continue to enforce their offensive mark that disparages native Americans as an unregistered mark under §
43(a)(1)(A)? Because, as noted by the Supreme Court, if they want governmental

Counterfeited Products in the USA, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/03/29/24-7-wall-st-counterfeited-products/7023233/.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
15. Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017) (holding that the Patent and Trademark Office’s denial
of a trademark registration “application based on a provision of federal law prohibiting the registration
of trademarks that may ‘disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute’ any ‘persons, living or
dead’ . . . violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment
principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”) (internal citation
omitted).
16. Id. at 1752-53 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
17. Id. at 1753.
18. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (listing additional grounds for refusal of registration that are still in effect
after the Tam decision).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012)
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any word, term,
name symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation or origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representing of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person . . . shall be liable in civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
(emphasis in original).
20. Dan Snyder, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/profile/dan-snyder/.
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authorities to stop infringing goods from entering the country, the mark owner must
present a valid registration to CBP.21
Both § 42 of the Lanham Act22 and § 526 of the Tariff Act of 193023 prohibit
the importation of merchandise bearing a registered trademark without the mark
owner’s consent, therefore, no registration of the mark translates to no CBP.24 Without registration of their mark, Dan Snyder and the NFL would still be able to sue
infringers and sue for damages and forfeiture of the infringing goods via § 43 of the
Lanham Act, but at their own expense.25 Thus, owning a registered mark has a major
impact on who can enforce the mark owner’s rights, and who bears the costs of
policing and enforcement.

21. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1753 (2017) (“Registration . . . enables the trademark holder
to stop the importation into the United States of articles bearing an infringing mark.”) (internal citation
and quotations omitted); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2012)
[I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle, bears a trademark
owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United
States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office. . . . a copy of the certificate of registration of his trademark . . .shall be kept . . . in the Department of the Treasury. . . and thereupon the
Secretary of the Treasury shall cause one or more copies of the same to be transmitted to each
collector or other proper officer of customs.
(emphasis added).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1124.
23. 19 U.S.C. § 1526.
24. Though because there are situations where it be difficult for CBP agents to determine when goods
are, in fact, counterfeit, enforcement is discretionary. See Olympus Corp. v. U.S., 792 F.2d 315, 320 (2d
Cir. 1986)
The administrative difficulties inherent in requiring the Customs Service to exclude gray market
goods make clear why Customs has long and consistently interpreted section 526 to allow it to
refuse to exclude the goods. Absent this bright line for administrative enforcement, the Customs
Service would expend resources excluding goods when later private litigation could disclose that
the markholder lacked isolable domestic good will and was merely engaging in price discrimination or other behavior questionable as a matter of antitrust law. Regulations that attempted to permit exclusion only of goods the markholders of which possessed discrete domestic good will would
. . . place the Customs Service in the position of having to determine at the time of border crossing
whether the domestic trademark holder had developed an independent public image in this country.”)
(internal citation and quotations omitted).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
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B. Expansion of Trademark Customs and Border Patrol Through
Website Seizures

With enforcement against bulk importers of counterfeit and pirated physical
goods safely in the hands of CBP, IP owners had another avenue that they wanted
to address. The internet marketplace allowed for small-scale importation that could
easily slip through Custom’s net.26 Consequently, mark owners needed a new enforcement mechanism to handle these businesses, and thus, found a way to prevent
these importations—domain name seizure through civil forfeiture proceedings under provisions in the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008 (“PRO-IP Act”).27 The PRO-IP Act dramatically changed the forfeiture landscape,28
[t]he newly created [s]ection 2323 of Title 18 established that articles, ‘the
making or trafficking of which are prohibited’ by a series of IP laws—
including criminal copyright infringement, trafficking in counterfeit goods
or labels falsely identifying copyrighted works as genuine, and unauthorized recordings of live musical performances or films being shown in theatres—are subject to forfeiture.29
Any property used for these purposes—and this was interpreted to include website domains—was now subject to civil forfeiture. 30
One consequence of these new enforcement tools is the increased probability
that sites hosting non-infringing works and goods would be seized.31 Abuse of the
seizure authority would harm online businesses, such as what happened to Rojodirecta.32 Rojodirecta was a target under “Operation In our Sites,” an ICE program
26. See Andrew Sellars, The In Rem Forfeiture of Copyright-Infringing Domain Names, SSRN 1-2
(May 9, 2011), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1835604.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2323 (2012).
28. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–
403, § 206(a), 122 Stat. 4256, 4262.
29. Sellars, supra note 26, at 7-8.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Nate Anderson, US Customs Begins Pre-Super Bowl Online Mole-Whack, ARS TECHNICA (Feb.
1, 2011, 10:13 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2011/02/us-customs-begins-pre-super-bowlmole-whacking/; Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 300-02 (describing the damage to Rojadirecta, Dajaz1, and other websites caused by the erroneous seizure of these websites).
32. Anderson, supra note 31.
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that began in 2008 to remove allegedly infringing websites by seizing U.S.-registered domain names believed to be associated with piracy or counterfeiting. 33 Rojodirecta was seized in 2011 during Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s annual “Super Bowl Seizure Spree,” where domain names were seized that were alleged to be infringing on NFL marks or illegally streaming games. 34 ICE obtained
a civil forfeiture order against Rojodirecta, relying on information from the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”). 35
After 18 months of stonewalling by the RIAA, however, claiming it had evidence of the direct infringement required under the law, but never producing it—
the federal government dropped its seizure claim against the service. 36 Rojodirecta
was one of only two website domains among 80 seized that challenged its forfeiture
order.37 The other site was Dajaz1, a popular hip-hop music blog, was also successful in eventually having its domain name returned, again for lack of evidence. 38 The
others did not have the resources to challenge the seizure, and there is no way to
know how many of them were not infringing, but merely lacked the resources to
mount a legal fight.39
Challenging the forfeiture order was an expensive, time-consuming process
and both Rojodirecta and Dajaz1 were harmed during the seizure by the shutdown
of their websites.40 Even though the RIAA and Motion Picture Association of
America’s (“MPAA”) lost their proxy-fought court battle, they were also winners
because they were able to shut down websites that legitimately competed with
RIAA and MPAA members—and the costs were born by the U.S. government and
the defendant website owners.41

A. Copyright
Along with stronger customs enforcement at ports of entry and seizures of websites, copyright owners have lobbied Congress to pass legislation that would expand
seizure to domestic websites and otherwise shift enforcement of rights.42 Most of
these attempts have failed, though there have been several successes.

33. Sellars, supra note 26, at 11.
34. Nate Anderson, Government Admits Defeat, Gives Back Seized Rojadirecta Domains, ARS
TECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:23 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/government-goes-02-admits-defeat-in-rojadirecta-domain-forfeit-case/.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. John R. Allison et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to “Preventing Real Online Threats to
Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 2011” (PROTECT-IP Act of 2011, S. 968),
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2011), https://www.eff.org/document/law-professors-lettersopa.
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1. Failed Attempts to Shift Civil IP Enforcement to the Department of
Justice
The entertainment industry has had several failed efforts to create dubious governmental enforcement mechanisms and relieve itself of the burden of fairly competing in the marketplace.43 One example is the proposed, but never enacted, Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (“COICA”), which would have
allowed ex parte governmental seizure of a website’s domain name, 44 if it “ha[d]
no demonstrable, commercially significant purpose or use other than” offering or
providing access to unauthorized copies of copyrighted works. 45 This seizure was
broadly protested due to the limited due process rights afforded the domain name
owner prior to the seizure.46 Many of COICA’s questionable anti-competitive provisions were resurrected in the also-failed Protect IP Act (“PIPA”)47 and the Stop
Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”)48 bills.49
The PRO-IP Act50 originally contained a provision, later removed, which gave
the Justice Department the authority to bring civil suits against patent and copyright
infringers, and turn over damages to the IP owners.51 This civil suit provision drew
heavy fire not only from online rights’ groups, who blasted it as an “enormous gift”
to large content owners, but also from the Justice Department itself. 52 In a letter to
43. See Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act, S. 3804, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010); Protect IP Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2012) (introduced in the House of Representatives as the “Enforcement
of Intellectual Property Rights Act.”); Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
44. S. 3804.
45. Id. § 2(a)(1)(B).
46. See Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, & David G. Post, DON’T BREAK THE INTERNET, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 34 (2011) (arguing that SOPA and PIPA “share an underlying approach and an enforcement philosophy that pose grave constitutional problems and that could have potentially disastrous consequences for the stability and security of the Internet’s addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that has helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free expression.”); see also
Allison, supra note 42.
47. S. 968.
48. H.R. 3261; see also, Annemarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System:
ICANN’s Ambivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343, 1363 (2017)
(“In 2010, a bill called COICA, which contained provisions similar to those that later appeared in SOPA,
was introduced in the Senate but failed to advance.”).
49. SOPA/PIPA:
Internet
Blacklist
Legislation,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
50. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–
403, 122 Stat. 4256.
51. See Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act, S. 3325, 110th Cong. (2008)
TITLE I—Authorization of civil copyright enforcement by attorney general; SEC. 101. Civil penalties
for certain violations. (a) In general—Chapter 5 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by inserting
after section 506 the following:
SEC. 506a. Civil penalties for violations of section 506. (a) In general—In lieu of a criminal action under
section 506, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in the appropriate United States district
court against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under section 506. Upon proof
of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such person shall be subject to a civil penalty under
section 504 which shall be in an amount equal to the amount which would be awarded under section
3663(a)(1)(B) of title 18 and restitution to the copyright owner aggrieved by the conduct.
(emphasis added); see also Nate Anderson, New IP Task Force Brings “Stronger and Stricter Enforcement”, Ars Technica (Feb. 16, 2010), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2010/02/new-ip-task-forcebrings-stronger-and-stricter-enforcement/.
52. Am. Assoc. of Law Libraries et al., Concerns Regarding S. 3325, The Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights Act of 2008, WIRED.COM (Sept. 10, 2008), https://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/copyrightactletter.pdf
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the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legislative Affairs contended that the proposed
law threatened to turn government attorneys into “pro bono lawyers for private copyright holders regardless of their resources.”53 The language was stripped from the
final enacted version of the bill.54

2. Successful Copyright Enforcement Shifts
Intellectual Property rights’ organizations have also had some legislative success. Two examples are (1) the IP enforcement provisions in the Higher Education
Opportunity Act Amendment signed in 2008;55 and (2) the enhanced Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) enforcement of intellectual
property rights.56
In the Higher Education Opportunity Act Amendment of 2008, entertainment
industry associations successfully lobbied for legislation that turned universities
into its enforcers,57 responsible for policing students’ use of the internet for infringing activities.58 Through a new provision of the Higher Education Opportunity Act
reauthorization of 2008, U.S. colleges and universities had general requirements
imposed on them regarding unauthorized file sharing, including: (1) the dissemination of an annual disclosure to students describing copyright law and campus
Section 101 would be an enormous gift of federal resources to large copyright owners with no demonstration that the copyright owners are having difficulties enforcing their own rights. For example, the
recording industry has threatened or filed over 30,000 lawsuits against individual consumers. Movie and
television producers, software publishers, music publishers, and print publishers all have their own enforcement programs. There is absolutely no reason for the federal government to assume this private
enforcement role.
53. Keith B. Nelson & Lily Fu Claffee, S. 3325 - Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Act,
PUBLICKNOWLEDGE.ORG (Sept. 23, 2008), https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/doj-letter20080923.pdf (“Title 1’s departure from the settled framework above could result in Department of
Justice prosecutors serving as pro bono lawyers for private copyright holders regardless of their resources. In effect, taxpayer-supported Department lawyers would pursue lawsuits for copyright holders,
with monetary recovery going to industry.”).
54. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110403, 122 Stat. 4256.
55. Institutional and Financial Assistance Information for Students, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(a)(1)(P)
(West 2017)
Information dissemination activities. Each eligible institution participating in any program under this
subchapter shall carry out information dissemination activities for prospective and enrolled students. The
information required by this section shall accurately describe institutional policies and sanctions related
to copyright infringement, including—
(i) an annual disclosure that explicitly informs students that unauthorized distribution of copyrighted
material, including unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing, may subject the students to civil and criminal
liabilities;
(ii) a summary of the penalties for violation of Federal copyright laws; and
(iii) a description of the institution’s policies with respect to unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing, including disciplinary actions that are taken against students who engage in unauthorized distribution of
copyrighted materials using the institution’s information technology system.
56. Dugie Standeford, ICANN Is Moving Toward Copyright Enforcement, Academic Says, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ip-watch.org/2017/02/28/icann-moving-toward-copyrightenforcement-academic-says/.
57. Specifically, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) lobbied for this legislation.
58. See William E. Kirwan, Letter Opposing the Inclusion of the Entertainment Industry Proposal on
Illegal File Sharing in the HEA, EDUCAUSE.EDU (Nov. 7, 2007), http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/CSD5226.pdf.
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policies relating to infringement of copyright law;59 and (2) a plan to “effectively”
combat the unauthorized distribution of copyright materials on their networks.60 To
comply with this latter requirement, many schools enacted policies whereby students faced sanctions including losing access to the school’s internet service and
academic suspension.61 Thus, to receive federal funds, schools had to police students’ internet use and become copyright enforcers for the rights holders, shifting
the burden and the costs associated with it.62
The expansion of ICANN’s enforcement of IP rights also shifted costs away
from copyright and trademark owners.63 In 1998, under contract with the U.S. Department of Commerce, ICANN was formed as a private-sector non-profit corporation to manage and oversee governance and administration of the internet’s underlying address system, the Domain Name System (“DNS”). 64 “ICANN was not created or intended to be an intellectual property enforcer but it was drawn from its
inception into disputes over trademark rights in domain names” when, in 1999,
“Congress amended the Lanham Act to include the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (“ACPA”), [which created] a [federal] cause of action . . . for badfaith registration of a domain name containing a protected trademark.”65 ICANN
almost simultaneously adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) for adjudicating fights over domain names containing trademarked
words and phrases.66
ICANN has insisted that its sphere of operations and responsibilities do not
include copyright enforcement; “ICANN has historically recognized that its role as
an online intellectual property enforcer stops at trademarks in domain names and
does not extend to copyrights in online content.”67 Corporate copyright owners,
however, lobbied to shift enforcement responsibilities, and thus the costs, to
59. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1092(a)(1)(P).
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Information Technology Services: Copyright FAQs, ST. LOUIS U.,
https://www.slu.edu/its/policies/dmca/copyright-law-faqs (last visited Dec. 8, 2017)
Q: What happens if the violation notice leads to your computer?
A: When Saint Louis University receives a violation notice, ITSC notifies the network user that they
must remove or disable access to the infringing material on their computer. Upon a second notification
to a student, network access for their personal computer will be suspended, and the matter will be referred
to the Office Student Conduct for appropriate disciplinary action. Upon a third notification ITSC will
terminate network access for anyone who repeatedly infringes on the rights of copyright holders.
(emphasis added); see also Copyright Infringement and Illegal File Sharing, VILL. U., http://www1.villanova.edu/villanova/unit/policies/AcceptableUse/copyright.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2017)
2.2 Penalties for Copyright Infringement
The unauthorized copying, sharing or distribution of copyrighted material is strictly prohibited. It is a
violation of federal law, the Copyright Act, and of the Code of Student Conduct. Students who infringe
a copyright are subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Student Conduct, up to and including
expulsion.
(emphasis added).
62. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1092(a)(1)(P).
63. Professor Annemarie Bridy has written about the substance of ICANN’s expansion into copyright
enforcement. See Bridy, supra note 48, at 1346.
64. Id. at 1349.
65. Id. at 1353, 1355 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012) (“A person shall be liable in a
civil action by the owner of a mark . . . if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties, that
person . . . has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark . . . and registers . . . a domain name that . . . is
identical or confusingly similar to that mark.”)).
66. Id. at 1346.
67. Id. at 1346-47.
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ICANN,68 contending that “all online intermediaries, including those that operate
the DNS, should be responsible for enforcing copyrights.” 69 To accommodate these
rights owners, while avoiding direct involvement in copyright enforcement activities, in 2013, ICANN altered its contracts with DNS intermediaries to support “a
system of extra-judicial, notice-driven sanctions . . . includ[ing] cancellation of domain names for ‘pirate sites’ about which right holders complain.”70 Other ICANN
contract modifications facilitated the MPAA’s “trusted notifier” enforcement program that utilized registry operators,71 thus, shifting this cost of enforcement of IP
rights away from the rights owners.

III.

ENFORCEMENT SHIFT THROUGH EX PARTE SEIZURES UNDER THE
DTSA

The shift of enforcement costs from rights owners to others—in this case, the
federal government—is again illustrated in the ex parte enforcement provision of
the DTSA, even though its omission from state trade secret laws has not hindered
adequate remedies for trade secret misappropriation.72 Its drafters’ claim that this
provision seeks to prevent foreign corporate espionage is spurious at best. 73

A. State Trade Secret laws
Forty-seven states have adopted, for the most part, the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act,74 and these state laws have been a satisfactory means of redress. 75 None of
these state trade secret laws have an ex parte seizure process similar to the provision
in the DTSA.76 Businesses are able to obtain relief via the seizure of goods created
based on the trade secret misappropriation, as well as the misappropriated trade secrets themselves through traditional injunctive relieve available under state trade
secret law, as well as under the Lanham Act’s unfair competition provisions. 77
There also does not seem to have been a problem with regard to capturing large
monetary awards under state trade secret laws. For example, in 2016, Epic Systems
68. Id. at 1347.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1348.
72. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
73. See Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 289-90 (noting that the idea of heading to the airport with
trade secrets “sounds like the premise of a Hollywood blockbuster movie, but . . . if someone is truly
‘heading to the airport,’ the trade secret owner needs a faster mechanism than any court can provide.”
(quoting Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014: Hearing on H.R. 5233 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 413-20, 511–14, 572-73 (2014) (statements of Rep. Goodlatte and Rep. Nadler,
who asserted that the ex parte seizure provision “will stop thieves planning to flee the country with stolen
American property”)).
74. New York, Massachusetts, and North Carolina have not adopted the UTSA, though North Carolina’s trade secret law closely resembles the Uniform Trade Secret Act. See Trade Secrets Act: Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade%20Secrets%20Act (last visited Dec.8, 2017).
75. See Rob Shwarts & Cam Phan, UPDATE: Money, Money, Money: Top 10 Trade Secret Verdicts
(With Our Runner-Up Overturned), ORRICK (Apr. 7, 2014), http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secretswatch/2014/04/07/update-money-money-money-top-10-trade-secret-verdicts-with-our-runner-up-overturned/.
76. Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 285-86.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
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procured a $940 million judgment against the Tata Consulting Group for misappropriating proprietary computer code.78 In 2014, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Seagate Technology’s massive arbitration award of $630 million over Western Digital Corporation.79 In 2011, St. Jude Medical won a $2.3 billion judgment
against Nervicon,80 which was later reduced to $947 million.81
But lawsuits and arbitration are expensive. Just in terms of discovery, a plaintiff
must request relevant materials, respond to inquiries and objections, store the materials, and review what could be thousands of records. 82 And unless it is enjoined
via a traditional, non-ex parte proceeding,83 the defendant business may be able to
continue to innovate and compete without being deprived of its resources.

B. Ex Parte Seizures under the Defend Trade Secrets Act
Despite adequate remedies at the state level, there was a push for a federal cause
of action, and what was legislated closely resembled the Uniform Trade Secret Act
with one big exception—the ex parte procedure provision.84 As noted in the introduction, this provision is the major difference between the state and federal laws, 85
and the ex parte provision under the DTSA relieves the plaintiff trade secret owner
of two burdens: (1) the burden of actually having to compete in the marketplace;
and (2) the burden of the costs associated with the discovery process of a lawsuit. 86
Under the DTSA, if a company believes its trade secrets have been stolen, it
can seek a court order to seize the trade secrets—and take possession of the computers, flash drives, cell phones, and any other device in which the trade secrets
allegedly reside,87 without providing notice to the defendant.88 Federal Marshals
can show up at the alleged offender’s door and confiscate computers, cell phones,
flash drives, and other documents.89 A special master appointed by the court must
78. Epic Systems Wins $940 Mln U.S. Jury Verdict in Tata Trade Secret Case, Reuters (Apr. 16, 2016),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tata-epic-verdict-idUSKCN0XD135.
79. Seagate Tech., LLC v. W. Dig. Corp., 854 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. 2014) (affirming the decision
of the Minnesota Court of Appeals to reinstate the arbitration award in full).
80. Pacesetter Inc. v. Nervicon Co. Ltd., No. BC424443, 2011 WL 2714864 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 22,
2011) (verdict and settlement summary).
81. Shwarts & Phan, supra note 75.
82. How Courts Work, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/discovery.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
83. See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Servs. Ltd., No. 14–cv–748–wmc, 2016 WL
1696912, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 27, 2016) (whereby after winning a jury verdict of trade secret misappropriation, the court granted the plaintiffs request for permanent injunction).
84. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
85. See Ex Parte Seizure, supra note 3, at 285. “Doctrinally, the Seizure Provision would represent
unprecedented innovation. No state trade secret law has a trade secret-specific ex parte seizure process
similar to the Seizure Provision” (citing The Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014: Hearing on H.R.
5233 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 413-20 (2014) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
86. See Ex Parte Seizure, supra note 3, at 285-88.
87. Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, No. 2:16-CV-524-PPS-JEM, 2017 WL 365619, at *4 (D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2017) (internal citations omitted).
88. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii) (“. . . the court may, upon ex parte application . . . issue an order
providing for the seizure of property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade
secret that is the subject of the action.”).
89. Id. § (b)(2)(B)(iv) (“If an order is issued . . . it shall . . . provide guidance to the law enforcement
officials executing the seizure that clearly delineates the scope of the authority of the officials.”); Ex
Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 290 (noting that “[T]he Seizure Provision . . . allows seizure of every . .
. copy of allegedly stolen information, which could include every computer that contains one or more
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then review all the materials to identify any misappropriated content, preserve it,
and remove it from the defendant’s computers, if necessary.90 The court may also
employ technical experts to assist in these tasks.91 These tasks consume time, labor,
and skill mainly at the expense of the courts, not the plaintiff.92
The plaintiff business is supposedly prohibited from directly accessing these
seized materials.93 In the meantime, however, the court has appropriated the tools
necessary for the defendant business to function, beyond the supposed trade secret.94 “A seizure could massively disrupt a targeted business, temporarily shut it
down,” or even kill it.95 The plaintiff company has effectively eliminated its competition without any litigation. There is no need to compete in the marketplace
through innovation or by producing higher quality products when one can use the
government to shut down the competition. This legislation has created an extreme
remedy whereby the trade secret plaintiffs can claim any basis to argue that things
have to happen quickly, and without notice, in order to preserve their trade secret
from misappropriation.96
This expansion of rights can easily lead to anti-competitive abuse. 97 Start-up
companies would be especially vulnerable when faced with the sudden seizure of
their computers, documents, and other items that may contain unrelated material,
including their own trade secrets, with no recourse until they are released at another
hearing or at the end of adjudication.98 And again, we see a cost shifting to taxpayers—for a mere $2,000 fee,99 seizure necessary for the preservation of evidence is

stolen files, along with any hard copy files containing printouts. Read literally, every storage medium of
a departing employee’s new employer potentially would be subject to seizure. A thorough seizure in a
departing employee situation could easily shut down the new employer until the hearing.”).
90. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv) (“The court may appoint a special master to locate and isolate all misappropriated trade secret information and to facilitate the return of unrelated property and data to the person
from whom the property was seized.”).
91. Id. § (b)(2)(E) (“At the request of law enforcement officials, the court may allow a technical expert
who is unaffiliated with the applicant and who is bound by a court-approved non-disclosure agreement
to participate in the seizure if the court determines that the participation of the expert will aid the efficient
execution of and minimize the burden of the seizure.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. § (b)(2)(B).
94. Id. § 1 (b)(2)(A)-(B).
95. Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 293.
96. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii).
97. See generally Levine & Sandeen, supra note 3, at 244-45; Professors’ Letter, supra note 3, at 3-4
(describing how the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision could be abused to harm competition by small
businesses and start-ups); Brook K. Baker et al., Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend Trade
Secrets Act of 2014” (S.2267) and the “Trade Secret Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233), SSRN 4-5
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2699735 (describing how the
DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision could be used for anti-competitive purposes).
98. Ex Parte Seizures, supra note 3, at 294
For well-established businesses with predictable revenues and costs, it may be possible to nonspeculatively estimate the costs and foregone revenues from a wrongful seizure. In contrast, thinly
resourced start-up enterprises could suffer less clear consequences from a wrongful seizure. As we
are increasingly seeing small start-ups blossom into Unicorns and Decacorns, a disrupted start-up
may lose billions of dollars of market cap potential.36 Judges will be reluctant to award large and
seemingly speculative compensating damages to an unproven start-up, even if a seizure permanently diminishes or destroys its business.
99. See, e.g., Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.
July 29, 2016) (Santa Clara Law Digital Commons) (ordering the plaintiff to “pay a non-refundable fee
of $2,000 to the U.S. Marshal to cover the cost of effectuating the seizure”).
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performed by officers of the court. 100 Thus, ex parte seizure is an unprecedented
remedy that can be used to effectively shut down legitimate competition.
Take for example, Surendra Mishra, who was accused of misappropriation of
trade secrets by his employer, Magnesita Refractories. 101 Mishra’s laptop was
seized, and he no longer had access to anything on it because his employer thought
he might be conspiring to misappropriate trade secrets.102 In this instance, the court
gave Mishra’s computers to his employer, who asked for access to the laptop for 48
hours so it could be imaged and returned, despite the prohibition of this action under
the DTSA.103 Magnesita had possession of Mishra’s own independently created
confidential material.104 Magnesita was able to stifle its competitor without having
to actually compete. Magnesita did this at little cost to itself. 105 A preservation order
could have served the same purpose, and was already available under existing laws
and court procedures, without these benefits to Magnesita.
As for the shifting of costs associated with the discovery process of a lawsuit,
the trade secret owner can use the government seizure and review of materials as a
substitute for the discovery process that would normally be at the plaintiff’s expense.106 The task of identifying the relevant evidence for collection, preservation,
and destruction is transformed into an all-encompassing sweep-up by U.S. Marshals
of documents, computers, and anything else that “may” contain the allegedly stolen
trade secret.107 The court stores these materials.108 The appointed special master,
who can hire technical experts to assist in the task, reviews the materials for relevancy.109 The special master examines, isolates trade secret information, and facilitates the return of unrelated property.110 This information is then passed on to the
presiding judge.111 The ex parte procedure provision is a boon to the bottom line of
trade secret owners, with little risk other than a $2,000 Marshal’s fee and $1,000
bond.112
100. Jeanne M. Gills, What’s Reasonable?—Protecting and Enforcing Trade Secrets in the Digital Age,
FOLEY,
https://www.foley.com/files/uploads/AIPLA%20Article%20on%20DTSA%20and%20Reasonable%20Efforts%20to%20Protect%20T
rade%20Secrets%2048.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2017) (Section “1836(b) authorizes a federal court to
issue an order in extraordinary circumstances and upon an ex parte application (based on a sworn declaration or verified complaint) to provide for seizure of property where necessary to preserve evidence or
prevent dissemination of the trade secret.”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii)(VII) (“[T]he person against
whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move,
hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice
to such person.”).
101. Magnesita Refractories Co. v. Mishra, No. 2:16-CV-524-PPS-JEM, 2017 WL 365619, at *1 (N.D.
Ind. Jan. 25, 2017).
102. Id.
103. Id. at *2.
104. Id. at *1.
105. Id. at *2.
106. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(E) (West 2016).
107. Id. § (b)(2)(B).
108. Id. § (b)(2)(D).
109. At the court’s discretion, the Plaintiff can be ordered to pay the technical expert’s fee. See, e.g.,
Mission Capital Advisors, LLC v. Romaka, No. 1:16-cv-05878-LLS, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016)
(Santa Clara Law Digital Commons) (ordering Mission Capital to “(b) recommend a neutral technical
expert for the Court to appoint, upon the request of the U.S. Marshal, to assist in the seizure; [and] (c)
pay the fee of the neutral technical expert.”).
110. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(D)(iv).
111. Id.
112. Mission Capital Advisors, at *5 (Santa Clara Law Digital Commons).
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CONCLUSION

The DTSA’s ex parte provision is part of the overall trend to shift costs associated with enforcement of IP rights and is a new avenue to stifle competition. By
relieving plaintiffs of many of the early costs associated with trade secret misappropriation litigation, as well as the ability to remove the necessary resources that its
competitor needs to operate its business, the provision has the strong potential to
become an anti-competitive arrow in IP owners’ quivers. Only time will tell how
this plays out.
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